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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of pri-
vatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account
the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost
of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in own-
ership not only on the objective function of the firms, but also
on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination
of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg)
games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never
increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are
realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades of the XX century a process of liberalization and/or
privatization occurred in most of the industrialized countries and, since
then, public utilities are generally no longer provided by public monop-
olies. The motivations for this program were essentially linked to the
general perception of poor performance of public monopolies and to the
idea that entry of private subjects could enhance efficiency. For exam-
ple, during the nineties, in Italy, in France and in UK, as in many EU
countries, the public incumbent faced the entry of private competitors
in many communication services. The same occurred in the production
of electricity, in gas retailing and more recently in some postal ser-
vices. In the same years, national (public) airlines started competing
with private or foreign ones in the domestic markets. Moreover, exam-
ples of public monopolies that became mixed oligopoly can be found
in a broad range of industries including railways, steel and overnight-
delivery industries, as well as services including banking, home loans,
health care, life insurance, hospitals, broadcasting, and education.1 In
these cases, instead of regulating a privatized monopoly, governments
decided to enforce a facility-based competitions in order to achieve a
so-called dynamic efficiency.2
Our investigation starts downward the liberalization process of a
public monopoly, and the aim of the present work is to build a theoret-
ical model for analyzing the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly.
Since we mainly refer to public utility markets open to competition, we
consider a mixed duopoly in which firms are characterized by increas-
ing returns to scale (with fixed and constant marginal costs) and we
Vincenzo Deniccolo` and Toshihiro Matsumura. This work also benefitted from com-
ments from seminar audiences at Universities of Bologna, Verona, Pavia, Tokyo and
Lisbon. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Salerno.
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles
of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy
Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.
1In industrial organization the term mixed oligopolies has been used to describe
imperfectly competitive markets in which public firms compete with private ones.
2For deeper viewpoints on the role played by facility-based competition in EU
and US Telecommunications liberalization and regulation processes see Taschdjian
(1997) and Stehmann and Borthwick (1994).
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assume that the public firm is typically less efficient than its private
competitor.3
The first novel contribution of this paper is represented by the intro-
duction of the shadow cost of public funds in the public firm’s objective
function. That is, we assume that the public firm is required to take
into account the distortionary effect of the taxes that are needed to
cover its deficit and, in general, public expenditures. In fact, absent
lump-sum tax instruments, if government rises 1 Euro from taxation,
society pays (1 + λ) Euros. Coherently, public profits, when positive,
avoid an equivalent public transfer, reducing distortionary taxes.4 As
initially analyzed in Meade (1944) and exploited in Laffont and Tirole
(1986, 1993), this approach has been used to characterize public mo-
nopolies running a deficit and, more generally, regulated markets. Here
we apply the same analysis to a public firm competing in a duopoly
and to the effects of privatization, given that getting money for reduc-
ing public debt or distortionary taxes, is often a complementary target
of privatization. The main consequence is that, taking into account the
shadow cost of public funds, the public firm puts more weight on its
own profits mimicking, at least partially, the behavior of a private firm.
The second contribution of this work is that we consider the effect of
privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determi-
nation of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg)
games. That is, the structure of the game is not assumed a priori, but
is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous decisions by the
players. In fact, in many economic situations it is often more reason-
able to assume that firms choose not only what action to take, but also
when to take it. Moreover, we believe that this approach is especially
relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy
prescriptions emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of com-
petition assumed. For example, in de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is
shown that privatization may improve welfare under Cournot compe-
tition even without efficiency gains; while, if a Stackelberg game with
3Differently from Cremer et al. (1989), the public firm’s higher cost is not a
neutral transfer from firm to workers belonging to the same economy but, as an
X−inefficiency, it reduces any utilitarian measure of welfare.
4Since public firm’s profit or deficit are not a neutral transfer among agents of the
same economy, they ought not to be weighted as private firm’s profits or consumer
net surplus in the utilitarian measure of welfare, but they should be weighted (1 + λ).
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public leadership is exogenously assumed, this cannot occur.5 In an-
other paper, Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) show that welfare may be
higher when the public firm is the follower than when it is the leader
in a Stackelberg game. In this way they provided an argument against
the standard view of the so-called Second-Best literature (see, for ex-
ample, Rees, 1984; Bo¨s, 1986) that claimed the sub-optimality of the
marginal-cost pricing rule.6
In the present work, in order to endogenize the timing of the game,
we apply the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to the
mixed oligopoly framework. In their insightful paper, the authors build
an endogenous timing game by adding to the basic quantity game a
preplay stage at which players simultaneously and independently de-
cide whether to move early or late in the basic game. Therefore, the
type of competition endogenously emerges in the subgame-perfect equi-
librium (SPE) of this extended game. Amir and Grilo (1999) apply this
model to a private duopoly showing that, in a quantity setting with
strategic substitutability, Cournot equilibria always result as the SPE
of the endogenous timing game. Pal (1998) addresses the issue of en-
dogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly by adopting the same
game structure. It is shown that sequential playing always emerges as
the endogenous timing and both Stackelberg solutions are the SPE of
the mixed-duopoly game. Even though after Pal (1998) other authors
analyzed the endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies, there is no work,
at our best knowledge, that extends this line of research to the welfare
evaluation of privatization.7
The main results of our analysis can be summed up as follows.
With respect to the determination of the endogenous timing in mixed
oligopoly, our results differ from Pal (1998), since in our model setting
either Nash, or private leadership or both Stackelberg outcomes can
result as subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the endogenous timing
game. Moreover, following the intuition of Beato and Mas-Colell (1984),
5The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is fundamental to their result that
privatization may increases welfare. This is generally not the case of a public utility
provider.
6See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey of these models.
7Matsumura (2003), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003) and Sepahvand (2004) apply
the same model to international mixed oligopolies finding that public leadership may
emerge as the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
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we show that when both Stackelberg game are SPE of the endogenous
timing game, private leadership is preferred by the public firm and it is
indeed selected when risk-dominance is used as the equilibrium selection
criterion.
This result is crucial to the evaluation of the welfare impact of pri-
vatization. In fact, differently from de Fraja and Delbono (1989), ab-
sent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Furthermore,
even when large efficiency gains are realized by privatization, an inef-
ficient public firm may still be preferred. The last result relies on the
fact that only with a public firm sequential outcomes (that are always
welfare superior) may be supported as SPE of the endogenous timing
game. Conversely, with private-owned firms, simultaneous equilibria
are always implemented.
It is worth noting that our results are obtained in a context of com-
plete information, and under the assumption that government has the
full bargaining power in the privatization process; that is, the price
paid by the new private owners for the former public firm is assumed to
be equal to its profit in the new (Cournot) equilibrium. This assump-
tion drives the results in favor of privatization, since it overweights the
revenue from privatization by λ in any welfare comparison.
In what follows, the next Section sets up the model. Section 3 is
focused on the issue of endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, while
Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of privatization. Our conclusions
are delegated to Section 5. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The basic setting
In a static, partial equilibrium analysis, we consider the simplest setting
of a mixed duopoly, where a private and a public firm, respectively
labeled with i = p, g, produce a commodity and compete in a quantity
game. Demand preferences are described by a linear function where
intercept and slope are normalized to one:
p (qg, qp) = 1− qp − qg
Both firms are characterized by constant marginal costs, ci ≥ 0, and
fixed costs, Ki ≥ 0, corresponding to irreversible investments.8 We
8We consider that the assumption of increasing returns to scale is coherent with
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assume that the public firm is already in the market and its fixed cost
is sunk. Conversely, the private firm’s fixed cost is borne only in case
of producing. Moreover, the private firm’s marginal cost is normalized
to zero, cp = 0, while the public firm’s one is positive, cg = c ≥ 0. That
means, c is an index of the public firm’s inefficiency.
The private firm maximizes its profit:
Πp (qg, qp) = (1− qg − qp) qp −Kp
The public firm maximize a utilitarian measure of welfare taking into
account the shadow cost of public funds, λ > 0. This parameter is
a measure of the dead-weight loss due to distortionary taxation. In
particular, let S(Q) denote the consumer gross surplus, where Q =
qp + qg is the industry total output. We assume that government can
choose the public firm’s output level qg and it can make a monetary
transfer T to the public firm. Then, in the presence of the shadow cost
of public funds, the maximization problem of the government is:
max
qg ,T
W (qp, qg) = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp)− λT
such that Π˜g = p(qp + qg)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg + T ≥ 0 (1)
where Π˜g is the public firm’s budget including the (positive or negative)
transfer T . Notice that the (participation) constraint (1) is not a hard
budget balance constraint but it is compatible with operative losses
when T is positive. From (1) we get
T = Π˜g − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
and substituting T in the objective function we obtain:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) +
+λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)− λΠ˜g
such that Π˜g ≥ 0
the presence of a public incumbent, former monopolist, in a liberalized public utility
industry. Nevertheless, the assumption decreasing return to scale is popular in the
literature. For papers adopting constant marginal costs, see Cremer et al. (1989)
and Martin (2004); while for papers adopting increasing marginal costs, see Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and
White (1998), Matsumura (1998).
5
Since welfare is decreasing in Π˜g when λ is positive, it is optimal to
set Π˜g = 0. Then, we have:
T = − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
The problem can be rewritten unconstrained as follows:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) + λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)
Defining the consumer net surplus as
CS(Q) = S(Q)− p(Q)(qp + qg) (2)
and the public firm’s operative profit as
Πg (qg, qp) = p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg (3)
the maximization problem of the government is reduced to:
max
qg
W (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πp (qg, qp) + (1 + λ)Πg (qg, qp) (4)
So, the objective defined in equation (4) implies that a transfer occurs
in order to guarantee the public firm’s budget balance. This transfer is
positive (negative) when the public firm’s profits are negative (positive).
The objective function (4) can be also interpreted as a weighted
average of welfare, defined as the net surplus generated in the market,
and the public firm’s profit, where the former is weighted by 1/(1 + λ),
the latter by λ/(1 + λ).
W (qg, qp) = V (qg, qp) + λΠg (qg, qp) (5)
m
1
1 + λ
V (qg, qp) +
λ
1 + λ
Πg (qg, qp)
where V (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πg (qg, qp) + Πp (qg, qp)
We know that other works on mixed oligopoly consider a weighted
average of welfare as public firm’s objective function. In fact, if we had
assumed a hard budget balance constraint without a public transfer,
as in Cremer et al. (1989), the weight given to the public firm’s profit
would have been endogenous and equal to the associate Lagrangian
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multiplier. Alternatively, as in Hindriks and Claude (2006) the weight
could be positively related to the endogenous share of a partially pri-
vatized firm owned by private investors, while as in Matsumura (1998),
due to incentive problem between government and public management,
in equilibrium a negative relation may occur. In the present paper
the weight of the public firm’s profit is exogenously correlated to the
shadow costs of public funds. In our analysis, introducing λ extends
the contract theory approach of public monopoly regulation to the case
of (mixed) oligopoly.
The best-reply (or reaction) function of the private firm is derived,
as usual, from the first order condition:
∂Πp (qg, qp)
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) + p′ (qg, qp) qp = 0
In the presence of fixed costs, the private firm’s reaction function ought
to be truncated in the point it crosses the zero-isoprofit curve and on-
the-boundary solutions can occur in equilibrium. Given the model set-
ting, it can be written explicitly in the following way:
rp(qg) =
{
1
2 (1− qg) if qg < qg
0 if qg ≥ qg (6)
where qg = qg : Πp (rp (qg) , qg) = 0
The public firm’s first order condition can be derived from the objective
(5):
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qg
=
∂V (qg, qp)
∂qg
+ λ
∂Πg (qg, qp)
∂qg
= [p (qg, qp)− c] + λ
[
p (qg, qp)− c+ p′ (qg, qp) qg
]
= 0
Notice that when λ = 0 public firm’s output decision follows the margin-
al cost pricing rule, and the first term in square brackets measure its
effect on total surplus (allocative effect). The second term is the effect
on the public firm’s profits, since the latter prevents the government
from using distortionary taxation to raise money (we call it the dis-
tortionary effect). When λ → +∞, the public firm plays as a private
(Cournot) competitor.
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Since there is no hard budget balance constraint and its fixed cost
Kg is sunk, the public firm’s reaction function is not truncated and it
can be explicitly derived:
rg(qp) = max
{
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(1− c− qp) ; 0
}
(7)
However, we want to focus on the case in which both firms produce
strictly positive quantities when they play simultaneously; so, we pro-
vide some assumptions on the admissible set in the parameters space.
Assumption 1 The parameters c and λ belong to the subspace
A ⊂ R× R =
{
(c, λ) |c ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
∨ λ ∈ [0, λ]}
where λ is a finite, reasonable value of the shadow cost of public funds.
Assumption 2 The private firm’s fixed cost Kp belongs to the subspace
B ⊂ R = [0,Kp] , where Kp is smaller than the producer surplus of the
private firm in any (simultaneous or sequential) equilibrium.
In Figure 1, the reaction functions are depicted. Coherently with
the Assumptions 1 and 2, the intersection occurs in the interior of the
parameters space where both firms produce strictly positive quantities.
An increase in λ has the effect of reducing both intercept and slope
of the public firm’s best-reply. When λ tends to infinite, the public firm
plays as a profit maximizer.
3 Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
In this Section we investigate how the determination of simultaneous
(Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games is the result of
preplay independent and simultaneous decisions by the players.9
9Notice that in formal game-theoretical terms, Stackelberg’s proposal is not to be
understood as a new solution concept for one-shot games, but rather as a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game of perfect information with exogenously given
first and second movers.
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Figure 1: Firms’ reaction functions
In many mixed oligopoly and privatization works, the timing of the
competition (simultaneous or sequential) is generally assumed, and si-
multaneous playing is mostly adopted.10 Of course, this assumption is
not neutral and it affects the results and the policy prescriptions on
privatization. For example, without efficiency gains, in de Fraja and
Delbono (1989) it is shown that privatization never improves welfare
when a Stackelberg game with public leadership is played; on the con-
trary, privatization may be welfare improving in the simultaneous set-
ting. Then, the welfare impact of privatization crucially depends on the
assumed timing.
More recently, other works introduced the idea that the order of
play should result from the players’ timing decision. In particular, in
a private duopoly with strategic substitutability it has been proved
by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and by Amir and Grilo (1999) that
simultaneous play emerges as the unique equilibrium of the endogenous
game. Conversely, in a mixed duopoly Pal (1998) shows that sequential
play always occurs in equilibrium.
10In Cremer et al. (1989, p. 284), the reason for using a simultaneous timing
is summarized as follows: “The common use of the Nash equilibrium in industrial
organization [...] suggests that this is at least as plausible as the leader-follower
situations [...].”
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Coherently with this approach, in order to endogenize the timing of
the play, we use the game with observable delay defined by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990). In the first stage firms simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose the timing of action (whether to move early or late) and
then, once observing each other decision, they play the basic quantity
game. The extensive form of the game is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The extensive form of the game with observable delay (Hamil-
ton and Slutsky, 1990)
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect equilibrium
(SPE) and each player decides the timing of action according to the
outcomes in the second stage (the basic game). Of course, none of
the firms can choose the type of competition by itself, but it can only
eliminate some outcome. For example, if firm i decides to move early
two outcomes are possible according to the decision of the other player;
only the Stackelberg outcome where firm i is follower is ruled out by its
decision.
Assuming existence and uniqueness of equilibria in each basic game,
the following Proposition summarizes the results obtained in Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) for any two-player game.
Proposition 3 Consider a two-player game for which the Nash and the
two Stackelberg equilibria exist. Given that both players always prefer
to be a Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous player, the set of (pure
strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game is defined in the following
way:
i) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is lower than the Nash payoff for
each firm, then the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the
Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move early;
ii) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than the Nash
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payoff for each firm, then the both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the
endogenous timing game;
iii) if firm i’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than its
Nash payoff and if firm j prefers to play simultaneously than to be Stack-
elberg follower, then the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is
the Stackelberg equilibrium with firm j being the leader.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows from Theorems II, III and
IV in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
The intuition behind these results is the following. Given that both
firms prefer to be leader than to play simultaneously, if the Nash payoff
is higher than the follower payoff, then any firm has a dominant strategy
to move early. But if one firm prefers its follower payoff to the Nash
payoff, there is no dominant strategy: when the other player moves
early it prefers to move late and vice versa. This explains the three
possible outcomes listed in Proposition 3.
We use Proposition 3 in order to determine the endogenous timing
equilibrium, where the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria in
each basic game are assured by Assumptions 1 and 2. The reduced form
of the endogenous timing game for the mixed duopoly is represented in
Table 1.
Private Firm
Public Firm Early Late
Early WMN (.), ΠMNp (.) W
GL(.), ΠGLp (.)
Late WPL(.), ΠPLp (.) W
MN (.), ΠMNp (.)
Table 1: The reduced form of the endogenous timing game. MN, PL
and GL stay respectively for Nash, Private Leadership and Public Lead-
ership equilibria.
In order to solve the game we need to compare the equilibrium payoffs
in each basic game. In what follows the simultaneous and sequential
equilibria are derived.
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3.1 Simultaneous equilibrium
When firms play simultaneously, the equilibrium output levels solve
the system of the best-reply functions (6) and (7). We refer to this
equilibrium as a mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium
values are labeled byMN. The output levels and the price in equilibrium
are
qMNg = (1 + λ)
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; qMNp = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
QMN = (1− c)− λ (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; pMN = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
Notice that when λ = 0, the public firm’s equilibrium output is such
that the market price is always equal to its marginal cost. It means
that the public firm implements a total output level equal to the one
derived in the case of a welfare maximizer (but inefficient) monopoly;
but now the welfare is higher.11 Moreover, when the public firm is as
efficient as the private one, the first best solution is implemented.
As λ increases, the public firm equilibrium output qMNg decreases
and qMNp increases; then, the industry total cost decreases enhancing
productive efficiency. This is because the public firm’s concern for pub-
lic transfers serves as a credible commitment to decrease its output.
Moreover, since the best-reply functions are contractions, the total out-
put level, QMN , decreases and the market price pMN increases. It is
obvious that the effect on consumer surplus is negative, raising an al-
locative inefficiency.12 The private firm’s profit and welfare represent
the payoffs of the players and in the simultaneous case are:
ΠMNp =
(
c+λ(1+c)
3λ+1
)2 −Kp (8)
WMN = 1−2c(1+λ)(1+2λ)
2+c2(1+λ)2(3+8λ)+2λ(3+λ(5+λ))
2(3λ+1)2
+ (9)
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
11This is because the same total output is partially produced by the more efficient
private competitor.
12There exists a clear trade off between technical and allocative efficiency, and the
net effect on total surplus is ambiguous and depends on the parameters.
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3.2 Sequential equilibria
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the SPE of a two
stage game of perfect information in which the second mover (follower)
chooses an action after having observed the action of the first mover
(leader). Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the strat-
egy of the second mover is a selection from its reaction function; and
(ii) the first mover chooses an action that maximizes its objective given
the anticipation of the rival’s reaction.
In what follows we first analyze the case of public leadership and
then the private leadership equilibrium.
Public leadership (GL).
When the public firm moves before its private competitor, the equi-
librium quantities solve the following equation system:
qGLg = arg maxW (qg, rp(qg))
qGLp = rp(q
GL
g )
The solution is:
qGLg = max
{
(1 + 2λ)− 4c (1 + λ)
(1 + 4λ)
, 0
}
qGLp =
1
2
(
1− qGLg
)
We have to distinguish two cases since there exists a threshold value
of the marginal cost of the public firm such that ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
the
public firm produces a positive quantity in equilibrium. When c ∈[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, the public firm prefers not to produce and the private firm
acts as a monopolist: its quantity, market price, and welfare are the
same as in a private monopoly.
Since the threshold value 1+2λ4(1+λ) is increasing, as λ increases an higher
level of inefficiency is compatible with positive production by the public
firm. In Table 2 quantities, profits and welfare in the public leadership
equilibrium are summarized.
Private leadership (PL).
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qGLp q
GL
g Π
GL
p
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
2c(1+λ)+λ
(1+4λ)
(1+2λ)−4c(1+λ)
(1+4λ)
(2c(1+λ)+λ)2
(1+4λ)2
−Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 12 0 14 −Kp
WGL
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
1
2
(4λ−2c−6cλ+4c2+λ2−4cλ2+8c2λ+4c2λ2+1)
(1+4λ) +
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 38 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 2: The public leadership (GL) equilibrium quantities, profits and
welfare.
Assume that the private firm moves before its public competitor,
that is, it behaves as a leader in the Stackelberg game. The equilibrium
quantities solve the following equation system:
qPLp = arg max Πp (rg(qp), qp)
qPLg = rg(q
PL
p )
The solution is:
qPLp = min
{
1
2
(c+ λ+ cλ)
λ
, 1− c
}
qPLg =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
1− c− qPLp
)
As before, we have two different cases depending on the value of c. ∀c ∈(
0, λ3λ+1
)
the public firm produces a positive quantity in equilibrium;
more precisely, it is optimal for the private leader to choose a quantity
such that the public firm’s best response is positive. When c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
the public firm does not produce in equilibrium and the private firm
plays as a public (inefficient) monopolist: its quantity, as a limit level,
is such that the market price is equal to the marginal cost of the public
firm.13 Of course total surplus is higher because the private competitor
produces more efficiently.
13This is the standard case when λ = 0: the public follower can always produce
the quantity needed to achieve this target and, anticipating this strategy, the best
action for the private firm is to produce that quantity.
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qPLp q
PL
g Π
PL
p
c < λ3λ+1
1
2
(c+λ+cλ)
λ
(λ−c−3cλ)(1+λ)
2λ(1+2λ)
1
4
(c+λ+cλ)2
λ(2λ+1) −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 1− c 0 c(1− c)−Kp
WPL
c < λ3λ+1
(4λ−4cλ+4c2+8λ2+λ3−10cλ2+17c2λ−6cλ3+22c2λ2+9c2λ3)
8(2λ+1)λ +
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 12 − 12c2 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 3: The private leadership (PL) equilibrium values of quantities,
profits and welfare.
Moreover, as λ increases, a larger inefficiency is compatible with a
positive production by the public firm. In Table 3 quantities, profits
and welfare in the private leadership equilibrium are summarized.
3.3 Endogenous timing equilibria
In this section we derive the endogenous timing equilibria of the mixed
duopoly game. In order to apply Proposition 3 we need to rank the
private and public firms’ payoff in the different equilibria. In particular,
in Lemma 4 we compare the private firm’s profit under public leadership
(i.e., the follower payoff) and in the Nash equilibrium, while in Lemma 5
we compare welfare under private leadership (again the follower payoff)
with the one in the Nash equilibrium. It is worth noting that these
comparisons are sufficient to apply Proposition 3. In fact, any player
always prefers to be leader than to play simultaneously, by the nature
of Stackelberg equilibria. Moreover, the comparison between the leader
and the follower payoff is useless since no firm can unilaterally switch
from one sequential equilibrium to the other.
Lemma 4 There exists a subspace F1 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the pri-
vate firm strictly prefers the public leadership equilibrium to the mixed
duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace F̂1 = A − F1 the reverse is
true.
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This result totally relies on the choice of the public leader to pro-
duce more or less than in the simultaneous equilibrium; and this choice
depends on the public firm’s objective being increasing or decreasing in
the rival’s output in the Nash equilibrium point.
In fact, private firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the public firm’s
output in any interior point14, and so, if qPLg < q
MN
g , the private firm
prefers to be follower than to play simultaneously.
The public leader chooses to produce a smaller quantity with respect
to the Nash equilibrium if ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp > 0 in the Nash equilibrium. In fact,
if its objective is increasing in the quantity produced by the rival, the
public leader prefers to reduce its quantity anticipating that the private
firm will increase the output, enhancing in this way the welfare.15
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
=
∂V
∂qp
+λ
∂Πg
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) +λp′ (qg, qp) qg = p (qg, qp)−λqg
In the Nash equilibrium:
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
∣∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
= c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
− λ (1 + λ) (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
=
c
(
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
)− λ2
(3λ+ 1)
Then, ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp
∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
> 0 if c > λ
2
2λ2+3λ+1
.
This result occurs when the increase in productive efficiency due to
the shift of some production to the private firms outweighs the negative
allocative efficiency effect due to the reduction in total quantity and the
negative distortionary effect due to the reduction in profits.
The threshold c (λ) is increasing because, as λ increases, the distor-
tionary effect makes the public firm more willing to produce a larger
quantity. So, only if c is high enough the overall effect of shifting some
production to the efficient private competitor is positive.
Lemma 5 There exists a subspace F2 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the pub-
lic firm strictly prefers the private leadership equilibrium to the mixed
duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace F̂2 = A − F2 the reverse is
true.
14Indeed, ∂Πp (qg, qp) /∂qg = p
′ (qg, qp) qp < 0 ∀qp > 0.
15Note that welfare increases despite the total quantity reduction.
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As in the previous Lemma, this result has to do with the fact that
W (qg, qp) may be increasing in qp. But now what matters is the decision
of the private leader, that always increases its output with respect to the
Nash equilibrium. As a result, total output increases and the allocative
efficiency effect is positive. Recalling that moving from Nash to the
public leadership equilibrium had a negative allocative efficiency effect,
we would expect that the parameter space F2 is larger F1. This intuition
is confirmed by the comparison of the thresholds c (λ) and c (λ). In fact,
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
<
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
= c (λ) ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Then, F1 ⊂ F2.
In the following Theorem the different SPE of the endogenous timing
game are derived.
Theorem 6 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of
moves is endogenous. The SPE of the endogenous timing game are
defined in the following way:
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique
SPE of the endogenous timing game;
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 ∩ F2, the unique SPE of the endogenous timing
game is the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm acting as
leader;
c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1, both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strategy)
SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Figure 3 depicts the three possible outcomes of the endogenous tim-
ing game in the space (c, λ). Without considering λ, the previous liter-
ature (Pal, 1998) defines a unique solution where both sequential equi-
libria are SPE. The novel contribution of our analysis is to enlarge the
set of possible outcomes defining conditions under which either private
leadership or Nash equilibrium may arise as the unique SPE. The intu-
ition is straightforward. Since the public firm’s objective function is a
weighted average of total surplus and profits, for low values of λ (given
c) our result coincides with Pal’s; for high values of λ (given c), the
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Figure 3: SPE of the endogenous timing game in the space of parameters
(c, λ)
public firm mimics the private firm’s behavior and we obtain the same
results as Amir and Grilo (1999) in a private duopoly. For intermediate
values of λ, private leadership is the unique SPE since the public firm is
more willing to accept a reduction in its own output when total quan-
tity increases (in the PL equilibrium) than when total output decreases
(in the GL equilibrium).
Moreover, when we focus on the sequential outcomes, the introduc-
tion of λ increases the level of inefficiency compatible with a strictly
positive quantity produced by the public firm in equilibrium. In par-
ticular, in the private leadership case, Pal (1998) shows that the public
firm never produces and its presence has a mere strategical role that in-
duces the competitor to produce the limit quantity. In our framework,
taking into account the shadow cost of public funds, the public firm
usually produces a positive quantity in equilibrium.16
16This is true as far as the public firm is not too inefficient. This result enhances
the realism of our approach where the public firm represents not only a threat of
producing, but it has an active role in the industry.
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3.4 Equilibrium selection
In the subspace F1 the endogenous timing game of the mixed duopoly
has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Then, this is a standard coor-
dination game with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-
strategy equilibrium. We now analyze the pure-strategy equilibrium
selection problem according to the risk dominance criterion developed
by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).17 Applied to coordination games with
two pure-strategy equilibria, this procedure picks the equilibrium that
has the largest basin of attraction in the initial beliefs of the players on
each other’s behavior. In other words, it minimizes the risk of a coor-
dination failure due to the strategic uncertainty that players face in a
coordination game (Amir and Stepanova, 2006). This criterion proved
to be a powerful selection concept in experimental settings of coordina-
tion games (Cooper et al., 1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990) and in evo-
lutionary games characterized by experimentation and myopic learning
(Ellison, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993). It is shown that the risk domi-
nant equilibrium is often selected even when it is Pareto dominated by
another equilibrium. One equilibrium risk-dominates the other if it is
associated with the larger product of deviation losses. In our framework
this means that private leadership is selected using the risk-dominance
criterion if(
WPL −WMN) (ΠPLp −ΠMNp ) > (WGL −WMN) (WGL −ΠMNp )
(10)
Theorem 7 The private leadership equilibrium risk-dominates the pub-
lic leadership equilibrium ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F1.
Then, the risk dominance criterion selects in the whole set F1 the
same equilibrium that the Pareto dominance criterion is able to select
only in a subspace of F1. It is important to highlight that the risk-
dominance criterion is applied to the reduced game, and not to the
entire two-stage game of endogenous timing, and the two options are a
priori entirely different. However, since each subgame has a unique Nash
equilibrium and given the use of subgame perfection in this framework,
17In the present setting it is possible to show that the standard refinements of Nash
equilibrium for normal form games – perfection, properness and strategic stability –
cannot be invoked to rule out one of the pure strategy SPE.
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our application of the risk-dominance criterion on the reduced game
seems to us rather natural.18 Amir and Stepanova (2006) suggest the
following interpretation: the private leadership equilibrium is chosen
by firms that wish to minimize the risk of coordination failure in their
timing decisions.
The preference for the private leadership equilibrium is the main con-
tribution in Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), where it is assumed that the
public firm is committed to a decision rule (in their case the marginal-
cost pricing rule), and the private firm maximizes its own profit given
the decision rule of the public competitor. In the present setting, using
the game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) coupled
with risk dominance as a selection criterion, we show that the private
leadership equilibrium emerges as the endogenous equilibrium in the
mixed duopoly ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2.
4 Welfare effect of privatization
In this Section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to
analyze the effects of privatization on welfare taking into account the
result of the previous Section on the endogenous timing equilibrium.
By privatization we consider the case in which the public firm is
sold by the government and the management is instructed by the new
owners to maximize profits:19
Πg (qg, qp) = [p (qg, qp)− c] qg
This change in ownership might have in principle the effect of enhanc-
ing the productive efficiency of the former public firm. We consider the
two extreme cases in which either no efficiency gain or full efficiency are
achieved. In the first case, the privatized firm retains the same technol-
ogy as before; in the latter, it is able to produce at the same marginal
18See van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) for the
application of the risk-dominance criterion on the reduced game of endogenous timing
models in price game duopolies.
19As in the mixed duopoly case, we assume that the fixed cost is sunk and already
paid by the government. So, it is included in the welfare, weighted (1 + λ), but not
in the privatized firm’s profit. Moreover, For simplicity, we keep the same subscripts
as in the mixed oligopoly framework. From now on, g stands for the privatized firm.
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cost of its competitor, here normalized to zero. After privatization, the
new reaction function of firm g is:
rg(qp) = max
{
1
2
(1− c− qp) , 0
}
(11)
with c = 0 in the case of full efficiency gains. Comparing the reac-
tion function before (7) and after privatization, it is easy to see that it
becomes steeper. Indeed:
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
>
1
2
∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
and only when λ→∞ the slope of (7) converges to (6).
Absent efficiency gains, also the intercept is reduced after privati-
zation. With full efficiency gains the intercept increases only when
c > 12(1+λ) .
The change in the reaction function is not the only effect of pri-
vatization. In fact, we have to consider the (possible) change in the
endogenous timing equilibrium. In order to derive the SPE of the game
after privatization, we can rely on the results in Amir and Grilo (1999)
that apply the same endogenous timing structure to a private duopoly.
The following Proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 8 Consider a private duopoly quantity game with strate-
gic substitutes. When the values of the parameters are in the admissible
set A, the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move early.
Proof of Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 no Nash
equilibrium lies on the boundary, i.e. no firm produces zero output.
In this case we can apply Theorem 2.2 in Amir and Grilo (1999) that
proves that both firms prefer always to be simultaneous player than
Stackelberg follower. So, according to point i) Proposition 3, the unique
SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is clear. Since the firm’s profit is strictly
decreasing in the rival’s output, a private leader always increases its own
quantity in comparison with the Cournot-Nash quantity. By the same
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reason, a private follower is always strictly worse off with respect to the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, sequential play is only sustainable in
a mixed duopoly.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the solution of the system of equa-
tions (6) and (11). Quantities and price are:20
qCNg =
1− 2c
3
; qCNp =
1 + c
3
QCN =
2− c
3
; pCN =
1 + c
3
In our analysis the new owners are always national. The (domestic)
total surplus and the privatized firm’s profit are:
V CN =
8− 8c+ 11c2
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−Kg −Kp; ΠCNg =
(
1− 2c
3
)2
In the case of full efficient privatization, recall that c = 0.
In order to compare welfare before and after privatization, the price
paid to the government for buying the firm matters. Since we are tak-
ing into account the shadow cost of public funds, it is not indifferent
whether profits are public or private, and if the government is able to
raise enough money from privatization. Given the equilibrium after pri-
vatization, the more money the government is able to raise by selling
the public firm, the higher the welfare after the privatization. In the
first instance, we give full bargaining power to the government; i.e., it
is able to extract the whole profit from the privatized firm. In this case,
total welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is:
WCN =
1
18
(
2λ+ 11c2 + 8− 8c (1 + λ− cλ))− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (12)
The following theorem states the result of the comparison when no
efficiency gain occurs after privatization.
Theorem 9 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of
moves is endogenous. In addition, assume that by privatization the firm
does not achieve any efficiency gain and all the profits are extracted by
the government. Then, privatization always reduces welfare.
20Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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This result is in sharp contrast with those obtained assuming simul-
taneous playing. For example, de Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that
assuming Cournot competition privatization may enhance welfare ab-
sent efficiency gains.21 The same result holds in the framework of the
present paper. Disregarding the endogenous timing game, and compar-
ing WMN from equation (10) and WCN from equation (12) ∀ (c, λ) ∈ A,
privatization may increase welfare. More precisely, it occurs when
c > 4λ+6λ
2+1
26λ+12λ2+8
Now, we move the analysis to the other extreme case: full efficient
privatization. The following Theorem formalizes the result.
Theorem 10 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of
moves is endogenous. In addition, assume that by privatization the
firm achieves full efficiency and all the profits are extracted by the gov-
ernment. Then, there exists a subset of the parameter J ⊂ A, such that
the privatization reduces welfare.
In Figure 4 we graph the set J in the parameters’ space where a fully
efficient privatization reduces welfare. Endogenizing the timing of com-
petition, before and after privatization, enlarges this space with respect
to the simultaneous case. In fact, it is easy to show that, assuming
simultaneous competition, privatization reduces welfare if
c <
3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
It is interesting to notice that the level of c such that public ownership
is the dominant solution in terms of welfare is decreasing in λ. This
occurs because, as λ increases, the profit motivation has a larger weight
in the public firm’s decision. So, the allocative efficiency effect of the
public ownership decreases and the productive efficiency effect of the
privatization becomes more and more important. Thus, we can say
that the more the public firm behaves as a profit maximizer, the better
is to privatize it. This result is obtained assuming that the government
21This result is obtained in a different setting with symmetric firms and increasing
marginal costs.
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Figure 4: The welfare effect of a full efficient privatization: in gray the
space of the parameters in (c, λ) in which privatization reduces welfare
when the government extracts all the profits from the privatized firm
is able to extract the whole profit from the new owners of the privatized
firm. Suppose now that the government is able to take just half of the
profit. How the previous result are affected? In Figure 4 we can see how
the space of the parameters such that the privatization reduces welfare
is enlarged. The dashed line delimits the space of a welfare-reducing
full efficient privatization when the government sells the public firm at
a price equal to half of the future profits.
An extreme result occurs when the firm is sold for free. In this latter
case, a full efficient privatization always lowers welfare.
5 Conclusions
The aim of the present work is to characterize the equilibrium and ana-
lyze the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly where an (inefficient)
welfare-maximizing public firm competes in the quantities with a do-
mestic private one.
We do not assume the timing of competition a priori. Rather, we
endogenize the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus
sequential (Stackelberg) games by applying the Hamilton and Slutsky
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(1990)’s model to this mixed duopoly framework.
Since we mainly refer to public utility markets open to competition,
we assume that firms’ production is characterized by increasing return
to scale, with fixed cost and constant marginal cost. In this framework,
we define the objective function of the public firm assuming that its
management is instructed to maximize welfare taking into account the
shadow cost of public funds. As the following citation suggests, this
approach has been generally used to characterize public monopolies
running a deficit.
[M]any public enterprises are natural monopolies, i.e.
firms that exhibit increasing returns to scale. Once it has
been proved desirable to run such an enterprise at all, its
product should be priced at marginal cost provided the re-
sulting deficit can be financed through lump-sum taxes. If
there are not lump-sum, discrepancies between consumer
and producer taxes will result in inefficiencies in the rest of
the economy. (...) This has been taken as an argument for
requiring the public enterprise to cover, by its own means,
at least part of its deficit. (Marchand et al., 1984)
We believe that extending this approach to the mixed duopoly frame-
work is rather natural and fills, at least partially, some gaps of the pre-
vious literature. Indeed, discussing the results of their paper, Beato and
Mas-Colell (1984, p. 82) state:
Finally, the limitations of this paper and the need for
further work should be clear. We have, for example, ruled
out both fixed cost and the general equilibrium effects of
distortions in other markets. We don’t know if reasonable
versions of the main results of this paper [...] are available
in these richer settings.
The extensive process of privatization started in the eighties of the
last century and still in place nowadays is essentially driven by the be-
lief that private discipline and profit motivation can enhance efficiency.
Moreover, privatization is also considered as a powerful instrument to
raise money to reduce distortionary taxation. In this work we con-
trast the general extent of these ideas. We show that, absent efficiency
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gains, privatization never increases welfare, and that an inefficient pub-
lic firm may be preferred even when large efficiency gains could be
realized by privatization. These results are obtained assuming that
both public firm’s profits and privatization proceeds are substitute for
distortionary taxation. The distortionary model applied to the mixed
oligopoly framework is not less important for our results. While after
privatization only the simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium can be
implemented, with a public firm sequential outcomes – that are always
welfare superior – may be sustained as SPE of the endogenous timing
game. Therefore, privatization changes not only the ownership and the
objective function of the public firm, but also the type of competition
in the market.
Finally, the assumption of public firm inefficiency deserves a last
comment.
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between ownership
and economic efficiency is still an open question. Theoretical support
to privatization was provided by the theory of incentives that demon-
strated how agency problems in state-owned enterprises can cause larger
inefficiencies than in private-owned firms. In fact, profit maximizing
owners subject to threats of bankruptcy and takeover have stronger in-
centives to reduce costs than politicians or bureaucrats. They would
motivate and monitor appointed managers more efficiently than when
there are wider and sometimes distorted objectives, soft budget con-
straints and complicated chains of command (World Bank, ed, 1995).
In addition, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) presents the “fundamental
privatization theorem” providing conditions under which government
production cannot improve upon private production. Nowadays, mod-
ern theory is less dogmatic in this respect (see Estrin and Pe´rotin, 1991).
For example, an owner-manager would indeed have strong incentives to
cut costs. But to privatize a managerial firm may increase costs, because
the profit motive can reduce the incentive to pay for lower managerial
slack (de Fraja, 1993; Willner, 2003). Public ownership may in some
models mean excessive labour intensity and private ownership the op-
posite, with ambiguous consequences for overall productivity (see Pint,
1991). The ranking of ownership is sensitive to details in the objec-
tive function and reward schedule if low performance means that the
manager is fired (Willner and Parker, 2007). Also, privatization often
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requires regulation, and hence an additional agency problem that may
sometimes cost more than public ownership (Laffont and Tirole, 1991;
Shapiro and Willig, 2001).
From an empirical point of view the picture is quite mixed.22 Most
of the works reports an increase in profitability after the privatization,
but the evidence of productive efficiency improvements is less clear and
the variance of the results is substantial (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. Comparing the equilibrium profits ΠGLp in Table
2 with ΠMNp in equation (8), it easy to check that ∀λ ≥ 0:
(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0.
(ii) ∀c ∈
[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 always.
Thus, we define the subspace F1 and F̂1 as follows:
F1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)}
(13)
Proof of Lemma 5. Comparing the welfare level WPL in Table 3
with WMN in equation (10), it easy to check that ∀λ ∈ (λ):23
22See for example the reviews of Megginson and Netter (2001) and Willner (2001)
that report the results of hundreds of empirical papers on privatization and on the
comparison of private and public ownership.
23The threshold c < λ
3λ+1
∀λ < 5.37228. Since λ is a measure of the distortion by
taxation, we are comfortable assuming that λ is lower than 5.37228. If λ ≥ 5.37228
we would have that WPL < WMN always.
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(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, λ3λ+1
)
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0
(ii) ∀c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
,
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Thus, we define the subspace F2 and F̂2 as follows:
F2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)} (14)
Proof of Theorem 6.
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash
equilibrium to the public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈
F̂2 the public firm is better off in the Nash equilibrium than in
the private leadership equilibrium. Therefore, in the intersection
space F̂1 ∩ F̂2, no firm wants to be follower. Since ∀λ ∈
(
0, λ
)
,
c (λ) < c (λ), it follows that F̂2 ⊂ F̂1; then F̂1 ∩ F̂2 coincides with
F̂2. Given that each player always prefers to be the Stackelberg
leader than a simultaneous player, point i) of Proposition 3 applies
and the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the
endogenous timing game.
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash
equilibrium to the public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈
F2 the public firm is better off in the private leadership equilibrium
than in the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. So, point iii) of
Proposition 3 applies and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the
private firm acting as leader is the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game.
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c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1 the private firm prefers to play as Stackelberg fol-
lower than to play simultaneously. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public
firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower than to play simul-
taneously. Since∀λ > 0, c (λ) < c (λ), it follows that F1 ⊂ F2;
then F1 ∩ F2 coincides with F1. So, point ii) of Proposition 3
applies and both Stackelberg equilibria belong to the set of the
(pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Theorem 7. In order to prove the result we need to consider
three cases depending on the fact that boundary solutions may occur
in the two sequential equilibria. By comparing the thresholds defined
in Section 3.2, we have the following equilibria:
(i) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c < λ1+3λ , both Stackelberg equilibria are
interior. Then, the values of WGL, ΠGLp , W
PLand ΠPLp of interest
are those in the first row of Tables 2 and 3.
(ii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and λ1+3λ < c < 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not
produce in the private leadership equilibrium while it produces
positive quantity in the public leadership equilibrium. Then, the
values of WGL and ΠGLp of interest are are those in the first row
of Table 2, while for WPLand ΠPLp we have to consider the values
in the second row of Table 3.
(iii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c > 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not produce
in both Stackelberg equilibria. Then, the values of WGL, ΠGLp ,
WPLand ΠPLp of interest are those in the second row of Tables 2
and 3.
Applying the criterion (10), straightforward but tedious computa-
tions show the result.
Proof of Theorem 9. In order to prove the result, we need to consider
three cases: (i) Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly;
(ii) private leadership is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly
with an interior solution;and (iii) private leadership with the public firm
not producing is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly.
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(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the
mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to com-
pare WMN , defined in equation (10) with WCN (equation 12).
Straightforward computations show that
WMN > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the Stackelberg
outcome with the private firm as leader is the relevant SPE of
the mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F2. Moreover, when c <
λ
3λ+1 the public firm produces positive quantity in the equilibrium.
Then, we have to compare the value of WPL in the first row of
Table 3 with WCN (equation 12). Straightforward computations
show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c < λ3λ+ 1
(iii) When c ≥ λ3λ+1 , the public firm does not produce in the pri-
vate leadership equilibrium. Thus, we have to compare the value
of WPL in the second row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 12).
Straightforward computations show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c > λ3λ+ 1
Proof of Theorem 10. When the privatized firm achieves full effi-
ciency gains, welfare after privatization is:
WCN
∣∣
c=0
=
4 + λ
9
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (15)
In order to prove the result we have to distinguish between three cases
as in Theorem 9.
(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the
mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to com-
pare WMN , defined in equation (10) with WCN (equation 15).
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Straightforward computations show that
WMN ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, c < 3(1+2λ)
2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
Thus, we can define the subset
J1 =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F̂2
∣∣∣ c < 3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)√2(3+8λ(1+λ))3(1+λ)(3+8λ) }
Referring to the definition of the subset F̂2 in (14), it is easy to
check that J1 is a nonempty set.
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the private
leadership equilibrium is the relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly
game when (c, λ) ∈ F2. Moreover, when c < λ3λ+1 the public firm
produces positive quantity in the equilibrium. Then, we have to
compare the value of WPL in the first row of Table 3 with WCN
(equation 15). First of all, define
F2a =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c < λ3λ+ 1
}
Straightforward computations show that:
WPL ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2a, 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ) +
−18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0
Thus we can define the subset
J2a = {(c, λ) ∈ F2a| 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ) +
−18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0}
that is nonempty.
(iii) Defining
F2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c ≥ λ3λ+ 1
}
31
the public firm does not produce in the private leadership equilib-
rium. Then, we have to compare the value of WPL in the second
row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 15). Straightforward com-
putations show that the subset J2b ⊂ F2b such that privatization
reduces welfare is not empty.
J2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2b|c < 13
√
1− 2λ⇔WPrL −WFE ≥ 0
}
Then, the subset of parameters’ values such that a full efficient pri-
vatization with full bargaining power to the government reduces welfare
is the following:
J = J1 ∪ J2a ∪ J2b
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